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SUMMARY
Compiled by BICC, the Global Militarisation Index (gmi) presents on an 
annual basis the relative weight and importance of a country’s military appara-
tus in relation to its society as a whole. The 2015 GMI covers 152 states and is based 
on the latest available figures (in most cases data for 2014). The index project is 
financially supported by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (bmz).
There are numerous sources of conflict around the world that are driving 
militarisation in many regions and inducing states to modernise their armed 
forces or increase defence budgets. Among the ten countries with the highest 
level of militarisation—namely Israel, Singapore, Armenia, Jordan, South Korea, 
Russia, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Kuwait and Greece—three are in the Middle East, two 
in Asia and five in Europe.
The United States and China are absent from the GMI Top 10, despite being 
global leaders in military spending. This is because when their military expendi-
tures are measured as a proportion of gross domestic product (gdp), and their 
military headcount and heavy weapon system numbers are measured per 
1,000 inhabitants, the situation looks rather different. Nevertheless, they are 
following the trend towards restructuring and modernisation of the armed forces.
The region with the highest level of militarisation is again the Middle East. 
This upward trend must be seen in connection with the violent conflicts across 
the region—the Israel–Palestine conflict, the war in Yemen, the civil war in Syria 
and the regional threat posed by so-called Islamic State (is).
In Europe, too, we find high levels of militarisation. Current crises, not least 
the war in eastern Ukraine, could become the factor that will push up defence 
budgets in the future. There is also a local arms race between Armenia and Azer-
baijan triggered by the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict.
Included for the first time in the 2015 GMI report is an examination of the 
relationships between militarisation and human development by considering 
the Human Development Index (hdi). For stronger economies, we find that a 
high GMI ranking is often accompanied by a high HDI value (Israel, Singapore). 
The relationship between militarisation and human development may again 
differ in countries where a high GMI is combined with a low HDI, such as Chad, 
or Mauretania. Here, disproportionately high spending on the armed forces may 
be taking critical resources away from development.
GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX 2015 \ JAN GREBE, MAX M. MUTSCHLER
BICC \ 3 \
CONTENTS
Summary 2
The methodology of the Global Militarisation Index (gmi) 4
BICC GMI  2015
The top 10 5
Regional armament in focus
Middle East  6
Sub-Saharan Africa  7
Militarisation in Europe 7
Europe’s most militarised countries 7
Western Europe 8
Eastern Europe 8
Militarisation in Asia 9
Militarisation and human development 10
GMI world map 12
Militarisation Index (Ranking) 14
Imprint 15
The Global Militarisation Index (gmi) depicts 
the relative weight and importance of the military 
apparatus of one state in relation to its society as  
a whole. For this, the GMI records a number of indi-
cators to represent the level of militarisation of a 
country:
 \ the comparison of military expenditures with 
its gross domestic product (gdp) and its health 
expenditure (as share of its GDP);
 \ the contrast between the total number of 
(para)military forces and the number of physi-
cians and the overall population;
 \ the ratio of the number of heavy weapons sys-
tems available and the number of the overall 
population.
1 \  The main criterion for coding an organisational entity as either  military 
or paramilitary is that the forces in question are under the direct control 
of the government in addition to being armed, uniformed and garrisoned.
THE METHODOLOGY 
OF THE GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX (GMI)
The GMI is based on data from the Stockholm 
Peace Research Institute (sipri), the International 
Monetary Fund (imf), the World Health Organization 
(who), the International Institute for Strategic 
 studies (iiss) and BICC. It shows the levels of milita-
risation of 161 states since 1990. BICC provides 
 yearly updates.
In order to increase the compatibility between dif-
ferent indicators and to prevent extreme values from 
creating distortions when normalising data, in a first 
step every indicator has been represented in a loga-
rithm with the factor 10. Second, all data have been 
normalised using the formula x=(y-min)/(max-min), 
with min and max representing, respectively, the 
 lowest and the highest value of the logarithm. In a 
third step, every indicator has been weighted in ac-
cordance to a subjective factor, reflecting the relative 
importance attributed to it by BICC researchers (see 
Graph below). In order to calculate the final score, 
the weighted indicators have been added up and then 
normalised one last time on a scale ranging from  
0 to 1,000. For better comparison of individual years, 
all years have finally been normalised. 
The GMI conducts a detailed analysis of specific 
regional or national developments. By doing so, BICC 
wants to contribute to the debate on militarisation 
and point to the often contradictory distribution of 
resources.
GMI indicators and weighing factors
Category / Indicator Factor
Expenditures
Military expenditures as percentage of GDP 5
Military expenditures in relation 
to health spending 3
Personnel
Military and paramilitary personnel  
in relation to population 1 4
Military reserves in relation to population 2
Military and paramilitary personnel  
in relation to physicians 2
Weapons
Heavy weapons in relation to population 4
A
B
C
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Militarisation remains a controversial concept. 
The GMI is deliberately designed to avoid the norma-
tive assumption that militarisation always means an 
excessive emphasis on military power, or that very 
high resource allocations necessarily have negative 
consequences for security or for overall social devel-
opment. Instead, the GMI approach does not only 
consider the scale of resources allocated to the mili-
tary but relates them to the wider society. Among 
other criteria factored into the Index are the propor-
tions of gross domestic product (gdp) spent on the 
military and spent on health. 
Numerous sources of conflict across the world 
continue to fuel the arms dynamic in many regions 
and cause governments to modernise their armed 
forces or increase their defence budget. Apart from ri-
valries between states, such conflicts largely involve 
internal armed struggles, civil wars, uprisings, unre-
solved territorial disputes, military confrontations 
and anti-piracy operations, but also the desire to proj-
ect military power in the service of one interest or 
another. Arms build-up is emerging as a trend in 
many parts of the world. Governments perceive the 
threats facing their country in different ways, and 
these are key in determining the way armed forces 
are set up and equipped. But the conditions and trig-
gers for strengthening or modernising the military 
are often different, and the changes in level of milita-
risation on the GMI values vary from country to 
country and from continent to continent.
In this 2015 GMI we will seek to analyse some of 
the current militarisation trends more closely. 
The Top 10
Among the ten countries with the highest levels 
of militarisation—Israel, Singapore, Armenia, Jordan, 
South Korea, Russia, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Kuwait and 
Greece—three are in the Middle East, two in Asia and 
five in Europe.2 In these countries, the armed forces 
are resourced particularly strongly compared to other 
sectors of society. 
By contrast, a number of major states and emerg-
ing economies are not found among the GMI Top 10. 
The United States, for example, is only ranked 29. 
 Although it clearly has the world’s biggest defence 
budget and a very large army, the resources allocated 
to the military are relatively moderate in relation to 
overall public expenditure, health spending and pop-
ulation size. Be that as it may, the United States ac-
counted for 34 per cent of worldwide military expen-
diture in 2014, having spent US $610 billion.3 On the 
one hand, this share has been falling over recent 
years and may shrink further in the course of the US 
administration’s austerity measures, so we could see 
successive changes in the level of militarisation for 
the United States. Moreover, the army will probably 
be numerically downsized with the end of US engage-
ment in Afghanistan and Iraq. On the other, none of 
this will alter the country’s overall global military 
 supremacy. Indeed, much of the attempted consolida-
tion, especially in the army, is part of restructuring 
and modernisation to improve capability in future 
missions. 
2 \  Syria was also ranked among this group of countries in recent years, 
but the civil war has made it impossible to draw on reliable data about 
resources going to government forces. We may, however, assume that, 
with the Syrian regime mobilising extensive resources, the level of 
militarisation in Syria is very high and will have again risen as the 
war unfolds.  In the case of North Korea and Eritrea, very high levels of 
militarisation can also be assumed. No valid data is available for either 
country.
3 \  Figures on military expenditure by individual countries are based 
on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(sipri).
Table 1
Top 10
Country A	B	C GMI Score Rank
Israel 5.9 6.0 3.5 890.2 1
Singapore 5.7 6.2 3.2 868.4 2
Armenia 5.8 5.9 2.9 835.8 3
Jordan 5.6 5.5 3.2 808.0 4
Korea, Republic of 5.4 5.9 2.9 801.3 5
Russia 5.8 5.1 3.2 794.5 6
Cyprus 5.3 5.6 3.2 794.2 7
Azerbaijan 5.8 5.3 2.8 786.4 8
Kuwait 5.8 4.9 3.1 772.4 9
Greece 5.2 5.3 3.2 771.7 10
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Regional armament  
in focus
Middle East
The Middle East remains a region in which most 
countries are highly militarised. Israel is again ranked 
above all other countries (position 1), a level of mili-
tarisation that is partly explained by its decades-long 
conflict with the Palestinians and the efforts by a 
number of Arab countries to build up their military 
capability that are regarded by the Israeli govern-
ment as a serious threat. The resources available to 
the military are disproportionately high by interna-
tional comparison. Israel’s military expenditure last 
year amounted to 5.2 per cent of GDP, a considerable 
economic burden on the country. And, against the 
background of the country’s security environment, 
Israel has a system of compulsory military service in 
which most Israelis are required to serve for three 
years. This enables the government to draw on a very 
large military reserve, now numbering 465,000 sol-
diers, in the event of war. For every 1,000 inhabitants 
in Israel there are 22.9 soldiers and paramilitaries, 
which is a very high ratio (for comparison, Germany: 
2.3), and only 3.1 physicians (2012 data).
The 2015 GMI lists Jordan in fourth place. In terms 
of numbers, Jordan has 17.9 soldiers and paramilitar-
ies, but only 2.5 physicians for every 1,000 inhabitants 
(2010 data). The country’s high level of militarisation 
is partly explained by the Israel–Palestine conflict. 
Jordan’s security environment has become increas-
ingly precarious in recent years, not least due to the 
upheavals in North Africa, the impact of the Syrian 
civil war and the regional threat posed by the so-
called Islamic State. These developments may drive 
further militarisation. Similar factors apply to Kuwait 
(position 9) where there are 6.7 soldiers and paramili-
taries per 1,000 inhabitants but only 1.5 physicians.
The multiple and complex conflicts occurring 
across the region are a key factor behind the build-up 
and modernisation of armed forces in which a num-
ber of states are investing their considerable oil wealth. 
Financial reserves accumulated in the years of high 
oil prices are being used to equip armies with the 
 latest warplanes and weapon systems, not least mis-
sile defence systems. Even though the currently low 
price of oil has significantly reduced the revenue 
flows to many governments in the region, it is having 
little impact on military expenditure. Defence budgets 
remain high, for the time being, as financial reserves 
are used to make up the loss in revenues. If, and this 
is seen as likely, defence spending continues to rise 
over the next few years there will probably be cuts in 
the financial resources available to other sectors of 
society. 
Saudi Arabia (position 17) is a case in point. The 
level of militarisation by the Gulf monarchy is proba-
bly connected with its enhanced engagement in the 
region, as seen most notably in the recent military 
intervention in Yemen and operations against so-
called Islamic State (is). Saudi military expenditures 
are rising, standing at 10.4 per cent of GDP in 2014. 
Even though the government’s revenues are waning, 
procurement of modern weapon systems remains at 
a high level, whereas the share of GDP spent on health 
has been shrinking in recent years (2013: 2 per cent). 
A strong focus of arms spending is air force moderni-
sation, with combat and tanker aircraft being pur-
chased to improve the Kingdom’s operational radius.
A similar case is Qatar (2013: position 57). Although 
there are no figures available for 2014, the emirate is 
likely to show rising levels of militarisation in future 
after its announcement in 2014 of a US $24 billion in-
vestment in modern weapon systems. This pushes up 
military spending sharply, taking a larger proportion 
of GDP than ever before and a shifting the ratio be-
tween heavy weapon systems and population size. 
Bahrain (position 15), Kuwait (9) and Oman (13)—
countries with a relatively high level of militarisa-
tion—are also having to contend with a low oil price. 
In Kuwait, around 91 per cent of government revenues 
are generated from oil sales. Although firm evidence 
of rising military spending in the form of specific 
arms procurements is not yet available, the conflict 
in Yemen may be driving militarisation, especially in 
Oman. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa
The Index records militarisation in most of Sub- 
Saharan Africa at quite a low level. Apart from Angola, 
the region’s highest ranking country (position 31), 
the exceptions include Mauretania (position 41), 
Chad (position 42) and Namibia (position 44). 
Angola has traditionally maintained a large army. 
Having gone through a long civil war, its armed forces 
occupy a strong position within state and society and 
exercise a great deal of influence. The government, 
which has enjoyed high revenues from oil sales over 
the years, is making large investments in modernis-
ing the armed forces, which explains the high level of 
militarisation. In particular, Angola has procured new 
aircraft and helicopters from Russia as well as from 
Brazil, the Czech Republic and the United States. 
 Additional air power is intended to secure the borders 
and control coastal waters. Military expenditures as a 
proportion of gross domestic product now comes to 
5.2 per cent, a rise of 1.7 per cent since 2011, while 
health spending amounts to just 2.5 per cent of GDP, 
a rise of only 0.3 per cent. (As for personnel numbers, 
the latest available figures are from in 2009 and show 
just 0.1 physicians but 5.5 soldiers and paramilitaries 
for every 1,000 inhabitants.) Not only procurement of 
weapon systems but also their maintenance and oper-
ation is expensive, binding additional resources over 
long periods—resources badly needed in other fields 
Table 2
The ten most militarised countries in the Middle East
Country A	B	C GMI Score Rank
Israel 5.9 6.0 3.5 890.2 1
Jordan 5.6 5.5 3.2 808.0 4
Kuwait 5.8 4.9 3.1 772.4 9
Oman 6.6 4.1 2.7 750.9 13
Bahrain 5.8 4.4 3.1 739.4 15
Saudi Arabia 6.5 3.9 2.9 734.6 17
Lebanon 5.8 4.3 3.1 727.7 19
United Arab Emirates 6.0 3.9 3.1 712.8 24
Egypt 5.2 5.0 2.7 705.2 26
Iran 5.4 4.9 2.5 700.2 27
in a country of widespread poverty. Over 50 per cent 
of Angolans still live on less than two US dollars a day.
Nigeria, militarily the strongest country in West 
Africa, has, by contrast, a low GMI ranking (posi-
tion 138). This is because Nigeria spends just 0.4 per 
cent of GDP on the military; and for every 1,000 in-
habitants there are 0.9 soldiers and 0.3 physicians. 
In view of the country’s numerous internal conflicts, 
such a low level of militarisation appears surprising. 
After all, a violent conflict has plagued the Niger Delta 
for many years, growing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
threatens the whole region, and the Boko Haram ter-
rorist group is creating mayhem in the north of the 
country. Yet Nigeria invests relatively little in its armed 
forces. The country is however engaged in large-scale 
naval procurements as a response to the threats in the 
south and is equipping the army with new armoured 
vehicles for the fight against Boko Haram. This may 
be reflected in a higher GMI level in future years. 
Militarisation in Europe
A large number of countries in Europe show an 
average level of militarisation, although their GMI 
rating could change in the future.
Europe’s most militarised countries
Two European counties have strikingly high levels 
of militarisation: Armenia (position 3) and Azerbai-
jan (position 8). Against the background of the on-
going Nagorno–Karabakh conflict, both countries are 
still investing their resources to an inordinate degree 
in expanding and modernising their armed forces. 
The same can be said of Greece and Cyprus, still rank-
ing high in the GMI. A key factor here is probably the 
enduring perceptions of a threat posed by Turkey. 
Even the leftist Syriza government has apparently 
not fundamentally called this view into question. 
 Although Greece has been forced to make major cuts 
in its defence budget over the last few years, the 
numbers show that there are still 13.5 soldiers and 
paramilitaries per 1,000 inhabitants. In contrast, the 
figure for physicians came to just 4.3. Moreover, 
Greece has around 1,350 heavy battle tanks, constitut-
ing by far the biggest fleet of tanks in Europe.4
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Western Europe
Whereas in the past few years military spending 
was cut back in western Europe, in particular, in the 
course of austerity measures to shore up hard-hit 
public finances, new tensions, especially the war in 
Ukraine, have become a driver for a future upturn in 
defence spending. Thus, spending on military pro-
curements and equipment by European NATO states 
fell between 2010 and 2014 by around US $14 billion, 
but NATO estimates suggest there will be a signifi-
cant rise in 2015.5 The organisation aims at an in-
crease of military budgets to two per cent of the GDP. 
This change of direction will impact over the medi-
um and long-term on militarisation levels if bigger 
procurements really are made and heavy weapon 
 arsenals are restocked. In western Europe, France 
(position 59), the Netherlands (position 101), 
 Norway (position 38), Sweden (position 100) and 
Germany (position 97), for example, have pledged to 
raise defence expenditures year by year in the future.
In the case of Germany, a strong economy means 
that increases in defence spending are likely to be 
 accompanied only by a very slight change in the mili-
tary share of GDP, which currently stands at about 
1.2 per cent. The military expenditures of most west-
ern European states, with the exception of France 
(2.2 per cent) and Greece (2.2 per cent), account for 
less than two per cent of their respective GDP. 
Eastern Europe
A number of eastern European states have also 
announced plans to boost military spending. After 
years of cut-backs, the Czech Republic (position 111) 
wants to increase military expenditures from the 
current 1 per cent share of GDP to 1.4 per cent by 2020. 
Lithuania (position 63) is committed to reaching 
the target of 2 per cent called for by NATO within the 
same timeframe. Romania (position 34) and Bulgaria 
(position 28) are planning similar increases in the 
years to come. The question of what financial scope 
exists for actually putting desired increases into 
practice remains open. It is not yet clear whether and 
how far the level of militarisation of European states 
will change. For one thing, the process of downsizing 
armies means fewer soldiers in service. Moves to 
abolish or suspend conscription, as occurred in 
 Germany and Sweden, mean fewer reservists will be 
available in the medium to long-term. By contrast, 
Lithuania announced in February 2015 that compul-
sory military service, revoked back in 2008, will be 
 reintroduced, initially for the next five years. This will 
alter the GMI parameters. 
Table 3
The ten most highly militarised countries in Europe
Country A	B	C GMI Score Rank
Armenia 5.8 5.9 2.9 835.8 3
Russia 5.8 5.1 3.2 794.5 6
Cyprus 5.3 5.6 3.2 794.2 7
Azerbaijan 5.8 5.3 2.8 786.4 8
Greece 5.2 5.3 3.2 771.7 10
Belarus 5.0 5.6 3.0 760.7 12
Finland 5.0 5.2 2.9 717.7 21
Ukraine 5.5 4.8 2.7 716.5 22
Turkey 5.4 4.9 2.7 716.3 23
Estonia 5.3 4.8 2.7 706.0 25
4 \  Germany has reduced its stocks of heavy battle tanks over the last 
25 years by around 2,000 units. At present some 225 heavy battle tanks 
are in active service, although the Bundeswehr plans to increase this 
number slightly in view of the latest developments in Europe.
5 \  http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_06/ 
20150622_PR_CP_2015_093-v2.pdf
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Russia has moved down one position on the pre-
vious year and is now ranked 6th. Russian military 
expenditures for 2014 totalled US $84.46 billion, which 
constitutes a 4.5 per cent share of gross domestic 
product. The number of military personnel in service, 
including those in paramilitary formations, amounted 
to 1,260,000, and Russia also has two million reserv-
ists. It is the numerically large forces, combined with 
large numbers of heavy weapon systems that explain 
Russia’s high ranking in the GMI, well ahead of, say, 
the United States or China. 
In the wake of the 2008 war in Georgia, which ex-
posed the shortcomings of the Russian Army, Russia 
launched a reform process in the armed forces with 
a strong focus on modernisation. Smaller, more pro-
fessional and more mobile units are to increasingly 
 replace the massed ranks of conscripts. Further steps 
are to be taken to strengthen special operations capa-
bilities. Russian weapon systems are also being up-
graded. Key elements in this modernisation are likely 
to be air force improvements, new precision weapons 
and automatic command systems as Russia seeks to 
at least narrow the gap with the military develop-
ment in the United States. Looking to the future, we 
will probably see Russia following a similar pattern 
as that of the United States and China, of reducing 
troop numbers. It does not signal a reduced role for 
the military but, rather, a modernised army. 
Just how far the conflict with Ukraine and the 
 resulting deterioration of relations with NATO will 
affect the level of militarisation in Russia can for the 
time being only be a matter of speculation. We may, 
however, assume that Russia will at least continue, if 
not strengthen, its efforts to modernise the armed 
forces.
The ranking of Ukraine in the GMI has shifted 
only a little, from 24 in 2013 to 22 in 2014. But it is too 
soon to tell how far the present conflict will have an 
impact on the country’s level of militarisation over 
the longer term. 
Militarisation in Asia
China, the leading military power in Asia, is 
ranked 87th in the 2015 GMI. China’s considerable 
growth in military spending (US $216 billion, accord-
ing to SIPRI, second only to the United States) has 
gone hand in hand with the country’s continuous 
economic growth. Economic expansion explains why 
military expenditure as a proportion of gross domes-
tic product comes to only around 2 per cent despite 
growing in absolute terms over many years. As for 
spending on health, this stood at 3.1 per cent of GDP 
in 2013, an increase of around 0.2 per cent since 2010. 
The Chinese leadership has recently announced 
plans to downsize the armed forces by 300,000 by the 
end of 2017, which will leave around 1.9 million sol-
diers in service. This will affect the level of militarisa-
tion and free up resources over the medium to long-
term. However, it is also likely savings will then be 
 invested in developing and procuring modern weapon 
systems for the Chinese Air Force and Navy as part of 
the ongoing modernisation. Modernisation costs 
 together with investment in military research and 
development will probably entail a further expansion 
of China’s defence budget.
Singapore, a country that ranks in second place 
in the GMI list, has one of the most powerful armed 
forces in the region. Despite its small size, Singapore 
maintains state-of-the-art weapon systems in large 
numbers and a large army. Most neighbouring coun-
tries, with the exception of China and India, have 
come to regard Singapore’s military as qualitatively 
and quantitatively superior. Military expenditures 
are 3.3 per cent of GDP, representing a very high share 
in regional comparison. In view of Singapore’s rela-
tively small population, its armed forces could be 
 regarded as numerically oversized, since there are as 
many as 27.3 soldiers, but only 1.6 physicians, for every 
1,000 inhabitants. The magnitude of the country’s 
forces and their equipment must be understood in 
connection with the strategy of total defence pursued 
by the political and military leadership since the 
1980s. 
GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX 2015 \ JAN GREBE, MAX M. MUTSCHLER
10 \ BICC \
In South Korea, which ranks 5th in the GMI, the 
conflict with North Korea6 is the critical factor behind 
its military doctrine and the alignment of its armed 
forces. Despite the recent diplomatic overtures, the 
two countries are still officially at war. South  Korea 
has a comparatively large army, with 659,500 soldiers 
and paramilitaries. This breaks down to 13.1 for every 
1,000 inhabitants, compared to only 2 physicians. De-
fence expenditures amount to US $36.7 billion, which 
is a 2.6 per cent share of GDP. The border between 
North and South Korea is one of the most highly mili-
tarised zones in the world. Interestingly, the South 
Korean defence doctrine also assumes a tous azumuts 
threat scenario, envisaging potential attacks from 
 Japan or China in the event of Korean reunification. 
Militarisation and human 
development 
The GMI tells us about the resources devoted to a 
state’s armed forces, showing which countries have 
particularly high or low levels of militarisation. The 
use of major resources for military purposes does not 
automatically mean a loss of economic potential. It is 
also possible for public expenditures on the military 
or the mobilisation of previously unused labour to act 
as an economic stimulus. Providing soldiers with a 
regular income generates purchasing power, while 
infrastructure investments for military purposes may 
also benefit the wider population. Yet, funding for the 
armed forces ties down resources that could be in-
vested in more productive sectors of society and the 
economy, such as education, health and sustainable 
electricity supplies. 
To explore this relationship we have correlated 
the GMI with the Human Development Index (hdi). 
The latter distinguishes between very high, high, me-
dium and low human development in each country. 
The following section considers the possible connec-
tions between social and economic development, 
measured by the HDI7, on the one hand, and a coun-
try’s level of militarisation, measured by the GMI, on 
the other. The correlations presented here do not, 
however, automatically suggest causalities. 
A. High militarisation and high human devel-
opment: The figures show that highly militarised 
countries tend to have a high level of human develop-
ment. An obvious reason for this would be that many 
of these countries have sufficient resources to invest 
in the military without significantly hampering eco-
nomic development. A clear case in point is Israel, 
Singapore or the Republic of Korea. These states stand 
at the top of the GMI but also belong to the group of 
countries with a very high HDI. 
Table 4
The ten most highly militarised countries in Asia
Country A	B	C GMI Score Rank
Singapore 5.7 6.2 3.2 868.4 2
Korea, Republic of 5.4 5.9 2.9 801.3 5
Brunei 5.8 5.2 2.7 768.5 11
Mongolia 4.9 5.2 3.2 737.5 16
Vietnam 5.4 5.4 2.4 727.8 18
Thailand 5.2 4.9 2.2 664.0 36
Myanmar 6.1 4.2 1.9 656.1 39
Cambodia 5.1 4.6 2.3 643.1 46
Malaysia 5.2 4.4 2.2 625.7 52
Kyrgyzstan 5.6 3.5 2.6 617.7 55
6 \  Although North Korea is likely to have a very high level of militarisa-
tion, no valid data is available.
7 \  The HDI values refer to 2013 data (i.e. the latest figures available).
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B. Low militarisation and low human develop-
ment: At the other end of the spectrum we find states 
such as Liberia, Gambia or Sierra Leone, which display 
both a low level of militarisation and a low level of 
human development. Take the case of Liberia and 
 Sierra Leone, which have both emerged from civil 
wars and rank in positions 149 and 146 respectively. 
Both countries have significantly cut back on their 
armed forces as a post-conflict environment and are 
to some extent still involved in a restructuring pro-
cess. They have hardly any heavy weapon systems 
and spend only 0.8 and 0.6 per cent respectively of 
gross domestic product on the military. By compari-
son, health spending in Liberia amounted to 3.6 per 
cent of GDP in 2013, and in Sierra Leone even as much 
as 1.7 per cent. 
So this poses the question of how low levels of 
militarisation might affect society in terms of human 
development. A very low level of militarisation can be 
an indication of fundamental shortcomings in the 
security apparatus that prevent the emergence of a 
secure and stable environment needed for economic 
development. While there can hardly be a purely mili-
tary solution to the multiple and complex conflicts 
across West Africa, it is also true that conflicts cannot 
be effectively contained by weak or even dysfunctional 
armed forces. In this situation, a low level of militari-
sation has negative consequences for human devel-
opment. 
Conversely, however, the low level of human 
 development may indicate that a country has very 
meagre resources overall and therefore has very little 
to invest in its armed forces. But, again, this is not 
necessarily the case.
C. High militarisation and low human develop-
ment: In some countries, such as Angola, Chad and 
Mauritania, we can observe a relatively high level of 
militarisation (position 31, 42 and 41 respectively in 
the GMI) accompanied by low human development. 
Here, the relationship between militarisation and hu-
man development may entail disproportionally high 
spending on the armed forces draining resources that 
are vital for development.
D. Low militarisation and high human devel-
opment: There are some interesting examples that 
show it is possible to keep militarisation at a low level 
while achieving a comparatively high level of human 
development. Iceland, Malta and to a lesser extent 
 Albania are such cases. In the GMI they are ranked in 
positions 143 (Malta), 144 (Albania) and 151 (Iceland), 
placing them among the world’s least militarised 
countries. Yet at the same time they enjoy high or 
even very high human development.
Graph 1
The GMI in relation to the HDI (examples)
    Human Development 
High Low
    Militarisation High Israel
Singapore
Korea, Republic of
Angola
Chad
Mauritania
Low Iceland
Albania
Malta
Liberia
Gambia
Sierra Leone
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Map 1
Overview GMI-ranking worldwide
The depiction and use of boundaries or frontiers  
and geographic names on this map do not necessarily 
imply official endorsement or acceptance by BICC.
Source conflict data: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Sources of administrative boundaries: Natural Earth Dataset
GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX 2015 \ JAN GREBE, MAX M. MUTSCHLER
BICC \ 13 \
  Rank 1–30                   Rank 31–60                 Rank 61–90                Rank 91–120              Rank > 120
no data available       countries in armed conflicts
14 \ BICC \
GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX 2015 \ JAN GREBE, MAX M. MUTSCHLER
MILITARISATION INDEX 
RANKING
 Rank Country
 1 Israel
 2 Singapore
 3 Armenia
 4 Jordan
 5 Korea, Republic of
 6 Russia
 7 Cyprus
 8 Azerbaijan
 9 Kuwait
 10 Greece
 11 Brunei
 12 Belarus
 13 Oman
 14 Algeria
 15 Bahrain
 16 Mongolia
 17 Saudi Arabia
 18 Vietnam
 19 Lebanon
 20 Morocco
 21 Finland
 22 Ukraine
 23 Turkey
 24 United Arab Emirates
 25 Estonia
 26 Egypt
 27 Iran
 28 Bulgaria
 29 United States of America
 30 Portugal
 31 Angola
 32 Serbia
 33 Yemen
 34 Romania
 35 Chile
 36 Thailand
 37 Iraq
 38 Norway
 39 Myanmar
 40 Peru
 41 Mauritania
 42 Chad
 43 Congo, Republic of
 44 Namibia
 45 Sri Lanka
 46 Cambodia
 47 Denmark
 48 Macedonia
 49 Botswana
 50 Ecuador
 51 Montenegro
 52 Malaysia
 53 Switzerland
 54 Pakistan
 55 Kyrgyzstan
 56 Guinea-Bissau
 57 Georgia
 58 Colombia
 59 France
 60 Paraguay
 61 Slovenia
 62 Uruguay
 63 Lithuania
 64 United Kingdom
 65 Hungary
 66 Afghanistan
 67 Australia
 68 Poland
 69 Gabon
 70 Burundi
 71 Bolivia
 72 Austria
 73 South Sudan
 74 Croatia
 75 Brazil
 76 Fiji
 77 Tunisia
 78 El Salvador
 79 Kazakhstan
 80 Italy
 81 Honduras
 82 Latvia
 83 India
 84 Venezuela
 85 Moldova
 86 Laos
 87 China
 88 Nepal
 89 Equatorial Guinea
 90 Guinea
 91 Indonesia
 92 Spain
 93 Belgium
 94 Canada
 95 Congo, DR
 96 Slovakia
 97 Germany
 98 Rwanda
 99 Zambia
 100 Sweden
 101 Netherlands
 102 Bosnia and Herzegovina
 103 New Zealand
 104 Guyana
 105 Togo
 106 Tanzania
 107 Nicaragua
 108 Philippines
 109 Guatemala
 110 South Africa
 111 Czech Republic
 112 Senegal
 113 Japan
 114 Ethiopia
 115 Argentina
 116 Luxembourg
 117 Ireland
 118 Libya
 119 Cote D‘Ivoire
 120 Mexico
 121 Cameroon
 122 Bangladesh
 123 Mozambique
 124 Tajikistan
 125 Kenya
 126 Dominican Republic
 127 Benin
 128 Zimbabwe
 129 Lesotho
 130 Mali
 131 Burkina Faso
 132 Belize
 133 Mauritius
 134 Jamaica
 135 Niger
 136 Ghana
 137 Madagascar
 138 Nigeria
 139 Seychelles
 140 Uganda
 141 Malawi
 142 Timor-Leste
 143 Malta
 144 Albania
 145 Trinidad / Tobago
 146 Sierra Leone
 147 Cape Verde
 148 Gambia
 149 Liberia
 150 Papua New Guinea
 151 Iceland
 152 Swaziland
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